No demands that affect the sovereignty, territorial integrity or constitutional course of Ukraine can become part of a peace agreement, regardless of what the Kremlin insists on, stressed in an interview with an UNIAN correspondent People's Deputy and member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence Fedir Venislavsky. According to him, Ukraine is ready for negotiations, but neither the reduction of the army nor a change in course towards NATO can become an ultimatum for signing a peace treaty. At the same time, the People's Deputy noted that Russia has found itself in a difficult economic situation and new sanctions may become one of the key levers of US influence on Russia in the negotiations.

In your opinion, will the Kremlin agree to the changed points of the agreement, in particular, the size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at 700 thousand people and Ukraine's refusal to enter the border with Donbas. Is this likely in your opinion?

I don't know what Putin will or won't agree to, because it's very difficult to get into the head of a dictator with a sick imagination. I can tell you that Russia today, according to all the analytical materials, information that we and our committee receive, and which are in the public domain and are heard from the lips of conscious analysts and even officials of the Russian Federation, is in a very, let's say, difficult financial, economic, and social situation. Therefore, Russia is undoubtedly also interested in stopping the war.

However, as we see from the regular statements of the same Ryabkov and other representatives of the Putin regime, they are trying to achieve"maximum" tasks, and these maximum tasks will definitely not be acceptable for Ukraine. That is, there can be no a priori refusal of our territories, because this does not correspond to the Constitution. And this has been repeatedly stated by both the President and representatives of our government.

Anything that contradicts state sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot, a priori, be legally formalized in any agreements, because it would contradict the Constitution.

As for the Armed Forces, I would divide this issue, again, into an issue related to constitutional and legal regulation and a purely practical issue.

From the point of view of constitutional and legal regulation, Article 17 - the protection of the Ukrainian territory of Ukraine, is divided into the Armed Forces and other military formations. And, undoubtedly, this is one of the key signs of sovereignty - to hope, let's say, that in the future, apart from our Armed Forces, someone can guarantee us our territorial integrity and state sovereignty - this is very naive and very unlikely.

Therefore, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the main basis of our power and our guarantee of security and independence. As for the reduction, it should be understood that this decision is made in the form of a law. Here, the size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is determined exclusively by law.

It's hard for me to imagine how this is possible. For the Verkhovna Rada to resort to some kind of blackmail and pass a law on the implementation of the provisions of this peace treaty as a reduction in the Armed Forces or a restriction on the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

But from a realistic perspective, we understand perfectly well that after the war, a million-strong army will be an unbearable number for Ukraine, and therefore I see no problem in the fact that after the war our army will have a somewhat smaller number than it does now, but this cannot be in the form of an ultimatum imposed on Ukraine from the outside.

You mentioned the"unbearable size" of the army. Please tell me, is Ukraine capable of maintaining such a large number of troops without the help of European allies?

It is very difficult to answer this question now. Today we know that the entire revenue part of the state budget goes to the security and defense sector. This includes armaments, ammunition, military equipment, and the salaries of our servicemen, but the military-industrial complex of Ukraine has also gained very good momentum during these four years of war. And I think that this can have a multiplier effect when our defense industry will provide our armed forces with newer, more innovative models of weapons, and at the same time it will give impetus to the development of the state's economy as a whole.

That is, it is difficult to say now whether Ukraine will be able to receive such a large number of armed forces. However, as I said, will we need a permanent active army in such a large number? Or will we simply need to form appropriate reservist units, which, if necessary, will be mobilized in a very short time and will repel any aggressor.

Therefore, now the question of whether it will be 500 thousand, whether it will be 700, or 800, or a million is very debatable, because everything will depend on what the Ministry of Defense needs to receive such a number of servicemen.

At the moment, in addition to the actual maintenance, we spend a lot of money on ammunition, which is a consumable. If this item disappears, the corresponding savings can be spent on other items. Therefore, I think that Ukraine is capable of maintaining a million-strong army for some time, but the question is whether it will be necessary.

What security guarantees can Ukraine have if it abandons its aspirations to join NATO?

The desire to join NATO is enshrined at the constitutional level. I think any changes to the Constitution are unacceptable for Ukraine. The President stated this. Therefore, abandoning the course of joining NATO is unlikely to be a point in this peace treaty. The fact that some leaders or countries may refuse to accept us into NATO is another matter.

But we definitely will not make changes to the Constitution of Ukraine, which enshrines the"NATO course", and this is an unacceptable condition for us.

Macron proposed the introduction of a NATO contingent into the territory of Ukraine as one of the points of security guarantees. Is there an option that Russia will agree to the presence of a NATO contingent, while our own army will be reduced?

The location of any armed formations on the territory of a sovereign country is determined exclusively by the Constitution of Ukraine. That is, this decision is made by the President and approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

No external consent is required, except for the country that wants or wishes to deploy its military continent on the territory of Ukraine, except for the two subjects of the Verkhovna Rada and the President. Therefore, this is the sovereign right of our state: to decide which military formations to allow into our territory. And no one can in any way encroach on this sovereign right.

If this clause is enshrined in the treaty, could it become a reason why Russia may refuse to sign it?

I don't think that the agreement will include a clause stating that French troops or any other troops will be stationed on the territory of Ukraine. If it is in the agreement, I think that it will be agreed in advance with all parties to the future peace treaty. Therefore, it is difficult to say anything now. In the text of those initiatives that were put forward in Ukraine as an ultimatum, there were no conditions for the deployment of other military formations on the territory of Ukraine.

Rubio told European allies that the US wants a peace deal before agreeing to any security guarantees for Ukraine. Does this US attitude threaten Ukraine's sovereignty and security? Because we cannot stop any hostilities if we don't have guarantees.

We have a whole series of bilateral security guarantees for Ukraine, which Ukraine has already concluded with a whole series of countries. No one will definitely cancel them. As for the United States, here we can distinguish between the legal fact of signing a document on guarantees, more substantial ones, and also the process of preparing for signing such a document.

If there is an exclusively formal moment that we first sign a peace agreement and then security guarantees, then I don't see anything wrong with that either. If these documents are prepared and the United States of America publicly, through its leaders - Trump or the same Rubio, or some other military - declares that they are ready to sign an agreement on providing us with security guarantees immediately after signing the peace agreement, then I don't see any big problem with that either.

The only thing is an understanding of what these guarantees will be. This should not be an intention, not an assurance, not a memorandum, not some declarative provisions, but specific legally binding actions in the event of any aggression on the territory of Ukraine by Russia. There should be a specific military response, economic and immediate, not after weeks or months of consultations. Which we have been talking about in large part since 22, when we began discussing these future security guarantees.

In your opinion, are there any pitfalls that could prevent the signing of this agreement from happening?

Well, you know, Russia doesn't need any special reasons. They can say anything and distort responsibility, firstly. Secondly, say that they don't like it and so on.

Therefore, it is important for us to demonstrate to all our partners that Ukraine is ready for peace. If Russia is not ready for peace, then, probably, there should be more decisive actions. I think that this will be the consequence if Russia refuses in one form or another under some imaginary pretext to sign a peace agreement that, as we know, was previously agreed upon.

And now there are consultations, I understand, between the American side and the Russian side. As you correctly said, Witkoff will go to Moscow, where he will talk about the points that have already been agreed upon, which have not yet been made public.

Is it possible to gradually lift sanctions on Russia and what role could this play in the negotiation process? Can the US blackmail Russia into lifting them and use this as leverage in negotiations?

Based on the known points agreed upon between the Russian and American sides, the previous version of 28 provisions discussed the possibility of a phased lifting of sanctions. However, the signing of a peace agreement does not automatically mean the lifting of these restrictions - they do not disappear immediately after the adoption of the document.

Every sanction or every package of sanctions will be considered by the countries that applied them, depending on their decisions, on how it will develop further, the right decision will be made. So I don't see any problems with that either.

I don't think the sanctions will be lifted immediately, although Russia is striving for this. This is one of its strategic priorities, as their economy is in a very bad situation, although there is still a margin of safety.

As for the lever of pressure, in my opinion, the States will threaten, at least in the public space, not only to maintain the existing sanctions, but also to apply stricter ones, because we see that as soon as a stricter sanctions policy was introduced in the energy sector, Russia became more lenient and at least showed readiness for peaceful initiatives.